Posts Tagged ‘ossetia’
[LINK] “South Ossetia’s unwanted independence”
Open Democracy’s Stephen Jones takes a look at South Ossetia. Nominally independent since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war like Abkhazia, South Ossetians seem inclined to favour unification with their co-ethnics in North Ossetia, in the Russian Federation. There’s little prospect of that, though.
‘[I]ndependence’ will bring little to most South Ossetians – they will be condemned to isolation, marginality, and dependence. The prospects for cooperation with Georgia, its natural economic partner, and contacts with the rest of the South Caucasus through traditional seasonal work and cross border trade, are closed. In the 2012 South Ossetian presidential elections, all four candidates declared they would not engage with the Georgian government. Local migration to North Ossetia and Russia has accelerated, particularly among youth, adding to the SOAO’s demographic decline (villages are disproportionately made up of older women).
the 2012 elections, Alla Dzhioyeva, an anti-corruption crusader against Eduard Kokoity, the outgoing president (unrecognised by Georgia and the rest of the international community), had victory snatched from her by the South Ossetian Supreme Court. Dzhioyeva’s challenge had been unexpected, and she was not Russia’s preferred candidate. Although Dzhioyeva was later given a cabinet post, it illustrated the region’s limited political autonomy, underlined by the intimidating and unchallengeable presence of the Russian military. That court decision supported the Georgian contention that South Ossetia is a not a real state, but a Russian vassal, subject to Russia’s strategic goals. South Ossetia’s borders remain under Russian control, and South Ossetian foreign policy simply does not exist.
South Ossetia does not have the autonomous functions of a state able to provide for its citizens, 80% of whom hold Russian passports. There is constant talk (which goes back to irredentist demands made in the early 1990s) by Putin and local South Ossetian parties for a simple solution – union with North Ossetia. This means annexation by Russia because North Ossetia is part of the Russian Federation. United Ossetia, one of the nine parties running in the June 2014 South Ossetian parliamentary elections, has made union with North Ossetia central to its platform. It would be a popular decision. In a rare independent survey of South Ossetians in 2010 by Gerard Toal and John O’Loughlin, over 80% expressed the desire for union with the Russian Federation, and 82% wanted Russian troops to remain in South Ossetia permanently. Unlike Abkhazia, there is, paradoxically, little support for independence.
[. . .]
There are, in addition, potential repercussions in the North Caucasus if annexation takes place. The North Caucasus, which consists of six non-Russian autonomous republics (which contain significant ethnic Russian populations) and over 40 national groups, is crisscrossed with conflict between clans, regions, religions and republics; there are multiple border disputes – between Ingushetia and Chechnya, North Ossetia and Ingushetia, between Kabardins and Balkars, and between Kumyks and Chechens in Daghestan, to mention just a few. Changing borders in the Caucasus is rarely accomplished peacefully, and right now Russia does not want to endanger its precarious control over the North Caucasian Federal District.
[LINK] “Georgian-Ossetian discord rumbles painfully on”
Writing for Open Democracy, Vakhtang Komakhidze writes at length about how the official policies of the Georgian government towards secessionist South Ossetia–basically, doing the best to cut off all contact with South Ossetia in the hopes that the South Ossetians will give in and unify with Georgia on Georgian turns–is counterproductive.
Over the 20 years of political and military confrontation between Georgia and its two separatist regions, it is South Ossetia that has had relatively better chance for settling its problems. The most difficult time has undoubtedly been the last few years since the 2008 war. Relations are virtually frozen: on the one hand, the Georgian government is refusing to accept recommendations which could have allowed greater cooperation; on the other hand, it offers no alternative to the EU’s recommendations and says nothing about any prospects for settling the Georgian-Ossetian question.
The shadow of the August war still looms large in Georgian-Ossetian relations and the bombing of Tskhinvali, the region’s capital, by Georgian artillery in August 2008 dominates the Ossetian media to this day. Unofficially, however, the Ossetian side has already expressed a hope that economic relations will be restored, most particularly in the Georgian-Ossetian border zone, where they were cut off unilaterally by the Georgians before the war.
The Ergneti open-air market extends over several hectares right on the administrative border. It came into being spontaneously in the second half of the 1990s, thanks to improved relations between the then presidents, Eduard Shevardnadze and Lyudvig Chibirov. The Ergneti market was an unofficial free trade zone of sorts and the business operations that took place there led to a rapid improvement in Georgian-Ossetian relations. Georgian currency began to circulate in the South Ossetian financial sector and people were able to move around on both sides of the conflict zone almost without restriction. The level of trust in trade relations improved to such a degree that trading partners on both sides distributed goods without prepayment. Georgian and Ossetian NGOs ran joint projects; the subject of the 1991 war almost disappeared from the media on both sides.
By 2003 Georgia and Ossetia were ready to start negotiating a political settlement, but relations began to deteriorate with the arrival in power of President Mikheil Saakashvili. His most important pre-election pledge had been the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity, but he tried to force events: under the banner of fighting corruption and improving the economy, the Georgian government closed down the Ergneti market, which accounted for a substantial part of South Ossetian revenue. The South Ossetian administration took this as a manifestation of political pressure. Georgian and Ossetian experts believed that economic regulation of the Ergneti market would have been possible, and its arbitrary closure led to a cooling in relations between the two sides and the eventual evaporation of any hope of a political settlement. The Georgian government responded with greater political pressure and militant rhetoric, which, in the end, escalated into the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008.
Is it cynical to suggest that Saakashvili doesn’t want to settle the South Ossetian conflict, since keeping the conflict going suits his interests and those of his government? Actually, if the treatment of refugees is indicative, it’s only honest to say that.
The town of Akhalgori remained under Georgian jurisdiction after 1992, but was occupied by South Ossetia in 2008. During the August war, refugees from this town and from other parts of the conflict zone headed for the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. The Georgian government quickly created camps, with basic housing painted in bright colours, to accommodate many of the displaced. These camps are however located away from population centres, and the refugees have little hope of finding work. They live in extreme poverty and their brightly-painted houses are a constant reminder of the war.
After the end of the hostilities, the South Ossetian administration offered the Akhalgori refugees a chance of returning to their homes. A crossing was set up on the administrative border, enabling people to move in either direction. Given the difficult social conditions in the refugee camps, many refugees decided to return to the occupied territory.
The Georgian government made unofficial attempts to stop refugees from Akhalgori District returning to their homes, and when a significant number of them did decide to head back, the government cut off the supply of natural gas to the district.
The Georgian government, however, made unofficial attempts to stop refugees from Akhalgori District returning to their homes. When a significant number of them did decide to head back, the government cut off the supply of natural gas to the district. In the winter, the lack of heating led many of the refugees to go back to the refugee camps and even those who had wanted to go home chose to stay in the camps.
Russian policies aren’t helping, clearly, but Georgia’s not exactly helpful, either.
Go, read.
A Bit More Detail 