Posts Tagged ‘ottoman empire’
[AH] On the 1914 Europe map of Diplomacy as an alternate history (#alternatehistory)
One of the things that I am doing now, in the early days of my quarantine, is playing an online game of Diplomacy with some old friends. Looking at the standard European map, an elaboration on the map of Europe and adjoining areas, makes me think of the way that this map might better represent different alternate history scenarios than our own history.
The distribution of supply centres, the starred regions capable of supporting military units, comes to mind. Each region is capable of supporting military units of very comparable power. This suggests to me a relatively even level of development across the map, that (say) Belgium and Bulgaria are at similar levels.
One thing that particularly jumps out at me as the relative power of southeastern Europe, including the Ottoman Empire. Anatolian Turkey apparently does have the economic power and military heft necessary to support Great Power status, to a level comparable to Italy or Austria-Hungary. Is Diplomacy set in a timeline where Ottoman modernization succeeded? (But then, how can the loss of the Balkans be explained?) On a smaller scale, Tunis being a supply centre might also suggest successful modernization there.
(Another thing that pops out as me is the space on the map for other Great Powers. A Scandinavia that encompasses three power centres could surely be a great power. A United Netherlands with only two supply centres would be more vulnerable, while it seems that the main problem with a Balkan conglomeration would be a backstory.)
An idea: WI there is an earlier separation of the European Balkans from the Ottomans, the shock of this separation triggering more successful modernization not just of the Ottoman Empire but of other Muslim states in the Mediterranean? Perhaps the Ottoman Balkans managed to split off as a unified state–a broader Orthodox conspiracy–and even managed to become a separate power themselves?
Another thing that pops out to me is the distribution of supply centres on the map in specific regions. A world where western France industrializes before eastern France, where Bavaria beats the Ruhr, where Trieste outstrips Bohemia (an Illyrian unit in the Hapsburg empire?), would be a very different world.
[LINK] Luke Coffey at Al Jazeera on Russia and Turkey
Luke Coffey’s opinion piece at Al Jazeera places the current breakdown in Russia-Turkey relations in the context of generally intense competition between the two post-imperial (?) countries.
The West might view recent events between Russia and Turkey as a new phenomenon, but this fails to take into account the complex and fraught relationship between the countries.
The downing of the Russian jet is simply the latest drama in a saga that has been playing out since the middle of the 16th century.
In one form or another, Russia has driven Turkish foreign and defence policy for centuries. Since 1568, Turkey and Russia have been to war 12 times. At least nine of the occasions have been over Crimea – which Russia illegally annexed last year.
Imperial Russia and the Ottoman Empire have contested regions in the Black Sea, the South Caucasus and the Balkans for centuries.
In 1772, Russian troops raided and briefly occupied Ottoman territory in the Levant. Even during World War I, Russian troops got within 160 kilometres of Ottoman-controlled Baghdad. The ensuing friction led to much bloodshed.
After World War II, Joseph Stalin’s designs on Turkey’s Eastern Anatolia Region and Soviet Russia’s wish to control the Turkish Straits were what originally drove Turkey into NATO’s arms.
[LINK] “Memo to Putin: Syria Is Turkey’s Ukraine”
At Bloomberg View, Marc Champion makes the obvious observation that Syria is to Turkey what Ukraine is to Russia. Neither ex-imperial hegemon should be surprised at the strong support for the others’ proxies.
Russian leaders have evidently been shocked by Turkey’s deliberate decision to shoot down one of their planes, which they say was motivated by Turkey’s alleged support for Islamic State and greed for the proceeds of smuggled terrorist oil. A simpler explanation is that Russia would have done the same.
Here is the hypothetical: What would President Vladimir Putin do if civil war broke out in a neighboring country, which had been part of the Russian empire for centuries before breaking away under circumstances, and with borders, that Russians still found difficult to accept? What would he do if, in that war, some of the rebels were ethnic Russians at risk of being brutally crushed by the armed forces of the neighboring state?
Actually, that’s not so hypothetical; it pretty much describes eastern Ukraine. And we know what Russia did — it became heavily involved in a poorly concealed invasion.
Syria was under Ottoman control from 1516 until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian Empire took over the Donbass region in the mid-1700s. The “Turkmen” rebels that Russia’s Su-24 aircraft was bombing at the time it was shot down are ethnic Turks. They ended up on the wrong side of the border when it was imposed by a 1921 treaty (shortly before the Donbass region was incorporated into Soviet Ukraine).
Even the strange psychology of how former empires feel they still have a special right, even responsibility, to intervene in long-since amputated parts is similar. When pro-democracy protests began in Syria in 2011, Erdogan said Turkey had to view the turmoil in Syria as a domestic issue. He was affronted when President Bashar al-Assad refused to do as he was told.
[LINK] “Amid refugee crisis, Hungary prime minister says Muslims not welcome”
Al Jazeera reports on the official stance of the Hungarian prime minister. I would note that Orban is apparently rejecting the basic thesis of pan-Turanism, a movement popular in Hungary that talked of that country’s historic ties with–among others–the mainly Muslim Turkic nations of Eurasia.
[Viktor] Orban spoke in Brussels at meetings between European Union leaders and Hungary’s prime minister after images of a drowned Syrian child on a Turkish beach grabbed world attention this week and said that it was not a moral argument for opening Europe’s doors.
“If we would create … an impression that ‘just come because we are ready to accept everybody,’ that would be a moral failure. The moral, human thing is to make clear: ‘Please don’t come,'” Orban told reporters.
In a later news conference, Orban said the history of Ottoman rule meant Hungarians would not accept large-scale Muslim immigration, a point made recently by neighboring Slovakia.
“We don’t want to, and I think we have a right to decide that we do not want a large number of Muslim people in our country,” Orban said. “We do not like the consequences of having a large number of Muslim communities that we see in other countries, and I do not see any reason for anyone else to force us to create ways of living together in Hungary that we do not want to see. That is a historical experience for us.”