Posts Tagged ‘abkhazia’
[NEWS] Three links from eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Macedonia, Moldova, Georgia and Abkhazia
- Bulgaria and Macedonia have at last signed a treaty trying to put their contentious past behind them. Greece next?
- The legacies of Stalinist deportations in Moldova continue to trouble this poor country.
- The plight of the ethnic Georgians apparently permanently displaced from Georgia has been only muted by time.
[LINK] “South Ossetia’s unwanted independence”
Open Democracy’s Stephen Jones takes a look at South Ossetia. Nominally independent since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war like Abkhazia, South Ossetians seem inclined to favour unification with their co-ethnics in North Ossetia, in the Russian Federation. There’s little prospect of that, though.
‘[I]ndependence’ will bring little to most South Ossetians – they will be condemned to isolation, marginality, and dependence. The prospects for cooperation with Georgia, its natural economic partner, and contacts with the rest of the South Caucasus through traditional seasonal work and cross border trade, are closed. In the 2012 South Ossetian presidential elections, all four candidates declared they would not engage with the Georgian government. Local migration to North Ossetia and Russia has accelerated, particularly among youth, adding to the SOAO’s demographic decline (villages are disproportionately made up of older women).
the 2012 elections, Alla Dzhioyeva, an anti-corruption crusader against Eduard Kokoity, the outgoing president (unrecognised by Georgia and the rest of the international community), had victory snatched from her by the South Ossetian Supreme Court. Dzhioyeva’s challenge had been unexpected, and she was not Russia’s preferred candidate. Although Dzhioyeva was later given a cabinet post, it illustrated the region’s limited political autonomy, underlined by the intimidating and unchallengeable presence of the Russian military. That court decision supported the Georgian contention that South Ossetia is a not a real state, but a Russian vassal, subject to Russia’s strategic goals. South Ossetia’s borders remain under Russian control, and South Ossetian foreign policy simply does not exist.
South Ossetia does not have the autonomous functions of a state able to provide for its citizens, 80% of whom hold Russian passports. There is constant talk (which goes back to irredentist demands made in the early 1990s) by Putin and local South Ossetian parties for a simple solution – union with North Ossetia. This means annexation by Russia because North Ossetia is part of the Russian Federation. United Ossetia, one of the nine parties running in the June 2014 South Ossetian parliamentary elections, has made union with North Ossetia central to its platform. It would be a popular decision. In a rare independent survey of South Ossetians in 2010 by Gerard Toal and John O’Loughlin, over 80% expressed the desire for union with the Russian Federation, and 82% wanted Russian troops to remain in South Ossetia permanently. Unlike Abkhazia, there is, paradoxically, little support for independence.
[. . .]
There are, in addition, potential repercussions in the North Caucasus if annexation takes place. The North Caucasus, which consists of six non-Russian autonomous republics (which contain significant ethnic Russian populations) and over 40 national groups, is crisscrossed with conflict between clans, regions, religions and republics; there are multiple border disputes – between Ingushetia and Chechnya, North Ossetia and Ingushetia, between Kabardins and Balkars, and between Kumyks and Chechens in Daghestan, to mention just a few. Changing borders in the Caucasus is rarely accomplished peacefully, and right now Russia does not want to endanger its precarious control over the North Caucasian Federal District.
[LINK] “In Russian protege Abkhazia, a cautionary tale for Crimea”
Maria Tsvetkova’s Reuters article overreaches in comparing the potential situation of a Russian-annexed Crimea with that of willing ex-Georgian but Russian satellite Abkhazia. Crimea was annexed directly into the Russian Federation unlike an Abkhazia which was left of outside, and moreover is of substantially greater sentimental and importance to Russians. Against this, Crimea is much larger.
Turning its back on Georgia, as Crimea has to Kiev, disrupted Abkhazia’s trade and transport and hitched its economy to the oil-fueled rouble, importing heavily from Russia, where wages and prices are much higher than in Georgia – or Ukraine.
[. . .]
Russia has said it could spend up to $7 billion this year alone to integrate Crimea’s economy into its own – no simple matter when they share no land border.
In Abkhazia, by contrast, Russia invested just a tenth of that in five years, from 2009 to 2013. Just over half went on construction projects, including kindergartens, two theaters and a stadium, and the rest on pensions and state workers’ wages.
[. . .]
Famed for its subtropical climate, clean sea and snow-capped mountains, Abkhazia was a favorite retreat for Georgian-born Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and a sought-after holiday destination for generations of workers from across the USSR.
Today, a broad new coastal highway covers the few miles to the Abkhazian border from the lavish Olympic Park built for this year’s Sochi winter games. But after the checkpoint, the road narrows. The picturesque mountain landscape is dotted with abandoned apartment blocks with empty windows and bullet holes.
Abkhazia won the 1992-93 war against Georgia but, like its population, which was virtually halved by an exodus of refugees, tourism has never fully recovered. It is hard to find a place on the shore without a view of battle-scarred hotels. The charred hulk of a public building dominates the center of Sukhumi.
[NEWS] Four links on Ukraine, Russia, Crimea, Tatars, and the European Union
- At Pando, veteran journalist Mark Ames has an article (“Everything you know about Ukraine is wrong”) arguing, from a generally pro-Maidan perspective, about the ongoing issues in Ukrainian (it’s a contest between factions backed by different oligarchies, fascism isn’t especially a Ukrainian issue, et cetera).
- The Atlantic‘s William Schreiber writes in “The Hidden Costs of a Russian Statelet in Ukraine” about the economic costs of a protracted Russian occupation of Crimea. In other regions, like Abkhazia and Transnistria, Russia has found itself spending billions of dollars to prop up local economies. Crimea, with two million people, is much bigger than all of these unrecognized states combined.
- Via Jussi Jalonen on Facebook, I found an Andrew Wilson Guardian article suggesting that Crimean Tatars are starting to mobilize against Russia. Crimean Tatars have, post-1991, strongly opposed Russian influence; militias are reportedly starting to form.
- MacLean’s shares an Associated Press article suggesting that, if the European Union and Russia applied sanctions against each other, the effects could be significant. Russia, which depends on the EU as its major export market, would be hit disproportionately, but the European Union would also have to find alternate sources of gas.